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Abstract
The Drinker Paradox is as follows.
In every nonempty tavern, there is a person such that if that person is drinking,
then everyone in the tavern is drinking.
Formally,
∃x
(
ϕ→ ∀yϕ[x/y]
)
.
Due to its counterintuitive nature it is called a paradox, even though it actually is a classical
tautology. However, it is not minimally (or even intuitionistically) provable. The same can
be said of its dual, which is (equivalent to) the well-known principle of independence of
premise,
ϕ→ ∃xψ ⊢ ∃x(ϕ→ ψ)
where x is not free in ϕ.
In this paper we study the implications of adding these and other formula schemata to
minimal logic. We show first that these principles are independent of the law of excluded
middle and of each other, and second how these schemata relate to other well-known princi-
ples, such as Markov’s Principle of unbounded search, providing proofs and semantic models
where appropriate.
1 Introduction
Minimal logic [11] provides, as its name suggests, a minimal setting for logical investigations.
Starting from minimal logic, we can get to intuitionistic logic by adding ex falso quodlibet (EFQ),
and to classical logic, by adding double negation elimination (DNE).1 Therefore, every statement
proven over minimal logic can also be proven in intuitionistic logic and classical logic. In addition,
minimal logic has many structural advantages, and is easier to analyse. Of course, there is a
price one has to pay for working within a weak framework. The price is that fewer well-known
statements are provable outright, which leads to the question of how they relate. This is a very
similar question to the one considered in constructive reverse mathematics (CRM; [8, 5]), where
the aim is to find some ordering in a multitude of principles, over intuitionistic logic. CRM
has been around for some decades now, and some even trace the origins back to Brouwerian
counterexamples. Most results in CRM are focused on analysis, where most theorems can be
classified into being equivalent to about ten major principles. It is a natural question to ask
whether we can find similar results in the absence of EFQ. Previous work by a subset of the
authors [6] has investigated the case of propositional schemata, but has left the predicate case
1Either as a rule, or an axiom scheme. See below for details.
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untouched. Similar work can also be found in [7, 10]. A more detailed approach, but again focused
on the propositional case can be found in [9], where it was studied exactly which instances of
an axiom scheme are required to prove a given instance of another axiom scheme over minimal
logic. In this paper we will make first steps in the predicate case. As is so often the case, the
first-order analysis is subtler and technically more difficult to deal with.
For the sake of brevity and readability we have only included non-trivial proofs. The missing
proofs, which are in natural deduction style, have been put into an appendix. A version of this
paper including that appendix will be made available on arxiv.org under the same title.
2 Technical Preliminaries
We will generally follow the notation and definitions found in [11].
An n-ary scheme SCH(X1, . . . , Xn) is a formula SCH containing n propositional variables
X1, . . . , Xn. An instance SCH(Φ1, . . . ,Φn) is obtained by replacing the variables with formulae
Φ1, . . . ,Φn. A scheme is derivable in a logical system if every instance is derivable in that
system. A scheme is minimal (constructive) (classical) if it is derivable in minimal (intuitionistic)
(classical) logic.
Example 1. The law of excluded middle, LEM(Φ) := Φ ∨ ¬Φ is a classical unary scheme.
A logical system can be extended by adding that certain schemata are derivable in the system.
In the case of natural deduction and minimal logic, an extension by LEM is an addition of a
deduction rule
LEM(α)α ∨ ¬α
for every formula α. This produces a subsystem of classical logic.
More general, if a formula Φ is derivable over minimal (intuitionistic) logic extended by
schemata S0, S1, . . . , Sn, then we write
⊢S0,S1,...Sn Φ
(⊢i,S0,S1,...Sn Φ).
Extending a logic by a scheme differs from allowing undischarged assumptions of instances of
the scheme. For example, it should follow from LEM that every predicate is decidable. Consider
the proof of ⊢LEM ∀x(Px ∨ ¬Px):
LEM
Px ∨ ¬Px
∀I
∀x (Px ∨ ¬Px)
The proof uses LEM(Px). However,
LEM(Px) 0 ∀x(Px ∨ ¬Px) ,
since the rule ∀I requires that x is not free in any open assumptions.2
It is trivial to check that the following holds.
2If we defined LEM as the axiom scheme ∀~xP~x ∨ ¬P~x, there would be no difference between adding it as a
rule or an assumption. This trick is the same as used in [11, page 14] for EFQ and stability.
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Proposition 2. Define DNE(Φ) := ¬¬Φ → Φ, and EFQ(Φ) := ⊥ → Φ. For all (finite)
collections of schemata S and T ,
S ⊢i T ⇐⇒ S ⊢EFQ T
and
S ⊢c T ⇐⇒ S ⊢DNE T .
A preorder ⊃ may be defined on finite collections of schemata by considering derivability over
extensions of minimal logic.
Definition 3. For schemata S0, S1, . . . Sn and m-ary scheme T , we write
S0, S1, . . . Sn ⊃ T
if
⊢S0,S1,...,Sn T (α0, . . . αm)
for all formulae α0, . . . , αn. We say that T is reducible to S0, . . . Sn. Intuitively, a proof using the
scheme T can be replaced by a proof using S0, S1, . . . Sn. The relation ‘⊃’ extends to multiple
schemata on the right-hand side in the obvious way.
To demonstrate that A0, A1, . . . An 6⊃ B, we exhibit a Kripke model (see Section 5.3 of [4] for
more details on Kripke semantics3) in which an instance of B does not hold, but where A0, . . . An
hold for every formula. A full model, as described in [6], is sufficient. A full model is one where
we can freely create predicates, as long as they satisfy the usual monotonicity requirements. So
it is full in the sense that everything that potentially is the interpretation of a predicate actually
is one. In Section 5 we will have to consider non-full models. An intuitionistic Kripke model is
one where ⊥ is never forced at any world. These are exactly the Kripke models that force EFQ.
In given Kripke diagrams, each state A has its labelled propositions on the right, and the
domain (denoted T (A)) on the left. Where the domain is given as N, it should be interpreted as
the countable set of constants {0, 1, . . . }, without the addition of any function terms.
Proposition 4. If ⊢B0,...Bm Φ, and A0, . . . An ⊃ B0, . . . Bm, then ⊢A0,...An Φ.
Proof. Consider a natural deduction proof of ⊢B0+···+Bm Φ. For each k, replace each instance of
the rule Bk with a proof of ⊢A0+···+An Bk. This produces the required derivation.
We examine relative strengths of a selection of schemata by considering their relations under
‘⊃’. The renaming of bound variables in a scheme should not affect its strength. For simplicity
of notation, it is therefore assumed that when working a predicate Px, any variables other than
x which appear in quantifiers are bound in Px. We write Py as shorthand for Px[x/y].
3 Principles
In addition to DNE, LEM, and EFQ, which are included below for convenience, we examine the
following principles as axiom schemata over minimal logic:
DNE(A) := ¬¬A→ A (Double Negation Elimination4)
3While technically speaking the Kripke semantics described in [4] are for the intuitionistic case, we can use
them in the minimal one, by not forcing and condition on ⊥—that is treating it just like some fixed propositional
symbol.
4Also known as “Stability”.
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EFQ(A) := ⊥ → A (Ex Falso Quodlibet5)
LEM(A) := A ∨ ¬A (Law of Excluded Middle6)
WLEM(A) := ¬A ∨ ¬¬A
(Weak Law of Excluded Middle)
DGP(A,B) := (A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
(Dirk Gently’s Principle7)
DP(Px) := ∃y(Py → ∀xPx) (Drinker Paradox)
Hε(Px) := ∃y(∃xPx→ Py)
(Schematic Form of Hilbert’s Epsilon)
GMP(Px) := ¬∀xPx→ ∃x¬Px
(General Markov’s Principle)
GLPO(Px) := ∀x¬Px ∨ ∃xPx
(General Limited Principle of Omniscience)
GLPO′(Px) := ∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
(Alternate General Principle of Omniscience)
DNS∀(Px) := ∀x¬¬Px→ ¬¬∀xPx
(Universal Double Negation Shift)
DNS∃(Px) := ¬¬∃xPx→ ∃x¬¬Px
(Existential Double Negation Shift)
CD(Px,Q) := ∀x(Px ∨ ∃xQ)→ ∀xPx ∨ ∃xQ
(Constant Domain)
IP(Px,Q) := (∃xQ→ ∃xPx)→ ∃x(∃xQ→ Px)
(Independence of Premise)
These principles are all classically derivable. That is, DNE implies all of these principles in
the sense of ⊃.
Principles CD and IP are also stated as
CD(Px,Q) ≡ ∀x(Px ∨ Q)→ ∀xPx ∨ Q
IP(Px,Q) ≡ (Q→ ∃xPx)→ ∃x(Q→ Px)
where x is not free in Q. These forms are syntactically equivalent to the definitions above for such
Q, but the variable freedom condition is not convenient to work with when classifying schemata.
5Also known as “explosion”.
6Also known as the “principle of excluded middle” and as “tertium non datur”.
7The name DGP was introduced in [6], and is a literary reference to the novel [1], whose main character
believes in “the fundamental interconnectedness of all things”. DGP is otherwise also known as (weak) linearity,
and is the basis for Gödel-Dummett logic [13].
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4 The Drinker Paradox and Hilbert’s Epsilon
The drinker paradox, which was popularised by Smullyan in his book of puzzles [12], is the scheme
DP(Px) := ∃y(Py → ∀xPx) .
Liberally interpreted, it states that (in every nonempty tavern) there exists a person such that
if that person is drinking, then everyone (in the tavern) is drinking.
Classically this is true because there is always a last person to be drinking, and it is true for
that person. Due to various non-classical interpretations of “there is”, however, countermodels
may be formed (see Figure 1). Notably, the constructivist may object that it is not always clear
who is the last to drink—except in the case of a tavern in which the number of patrons is an
enumerable positive integer amount.
The drinker paradox can alternatively be stated as
∃y∀x(Py → Px) .8
The dual of the drinker paradox is the scheme
Hε(Px) := ∃y(∃xPx→ Py) ,
or alternatively,
∃y∀x(Px→ Py) .
Hε resembles an axiom scheme form of Hilbert’s Epsilon operator [2]. In particular, within a
natural deduction proof, from ∃xPx it allows a temporary name for a term satisfying P to be
introduced. It is equivalent to Independence of Premise
IP(Px,Q) := (∃xQ→ ∃xPx)→ ∃x(∃xQ→ Px) .
This does not have the same power as Hilbert’s Epsilon operator, however.9
We will now characterise (full Kripke) models in which DP and/or Hε hold, and use these to
separate the two schemata. We will ignore models containing disconnected states (i.e. models
where there are pairs of states such that every state related to one is unrelated to the other), as
these can be examined by the characteristics of the individual components.
First consider a model with states A  B where there is a term t ∈ T (B)\T (A) (for example
Figure 1). Create a predicate Px with A  Ps for all s ∈ T (A) (and take the upwards closure).
Now B 6 Pt, so A 6 Ps→ ∀xPx, so DP fails. Furthermore, create a predicate Qx with B  Qt
(and take the upwards closure). Then B  ∃xQx, but B 6 Qs for any s ∈ T (A). Thus Hε fails
at A. Hence any model for either DP or Hε must have the same terms known at every related
pair of states. We will from now on consider only these models. Moreover, note that a system
with only one term at each state trivially models DP and Hε.
Now consider a model with a branch in it, i.e. there are states A,B,C such that A  B,
A  C, and B is not related to C. Assume there are at least two distinct terms understood at
A. Let t be one such term. Then create a predicate P with B  Pt, and C  Ps for all terms
s ∈ T (A) : s 6= t (and any other states forcing these atomic formulae as required to maintain
upwards closure). Certainly neither B nor C force ∀xPx, but for every u ∈ T (A) either B or C
forces Pu, so DP fails at A. Furthermore if u ∈ T (A) then either B or C will fail to force Pu,
8For a proof that this is actually an equivalent formulation see the appendix.
9Milly Maietti has communicated to us the—currently unpublished—result that Hilbert’s Epsilon operator
implies the drinker paradox. Thus, together with our results in this paper this shows that the operator version of
Hε is stronger than the scheme version.
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AB
{s} Ps
{s, t} Ps,Qt
Figure 1: Kripke countermodel for DP(Px) and Hε(Qx)
but both states force ∃xPx, so Hε also fails at A. Hence any model for DP or Hε with more
than two terms must have no branches, i.e. be totally ordered.
A
B C
{s, t}
{s, t} Pt {s, t} Ps
Figure 2: Kripke countermodel for both DP(Px) and Hε(Px)
Consider then a linear model with finitely many terms. Given a predicate Qx, if every state
forces Qt for every term or if every state does not force Qt for any term, then both DP and
Hε trivially hold (by applying the classical reasoning), so we may suppose that this is not the
case. For each term t, assign a set Ut = {A ∈ Σ|A 6 Qt}. By upwards closure (and the
assumed linearity), if t and s are terms then either Ut ⊆ Us or Us ⊆ Ut, meaning these sets are
totally ordered with respect to the subset relation. There are finitely many of them, so there
must be a maximal set Utmax with associated term tmax. Suppose a state A forces Qtmax. Then
A 6∈ Utmax , and so A 6∈ Us for every term s. Thus A forces Qs. Hence Qtmax → ∀xQx holds in
the model, and so this is a model for DP. A similar argument shows Hε also holds, using sets
Vt = {A ∈ Σ|A  Qt}, and in particular the maximal set Vt0 , to show that ∃xQx→ Qt0 is forced
everywhere.
We now know that to separate DP and Hε we require linear models with infinitely many
terms.
Proposition 5. Hε does not imply DP in intuitionistic logic.
Proof. Consider the (intuitionistic) Kripke model with infinitely many worlds below. In general,
An  An+1 and An  P0 . . . Pn, and the domain at every world is N.
A0
A1
A2
N P0
N P0, P1
N P0, P1, P2
N P0, P1, P2, P3
6
No state forces ∀xPx, but for any term t ∈ T (A0) we have A0  At and At  Pt. Therefore
A0 6 ∃y(Py → ∀xPx), i.e. DP does not hold in this model. (In fact, this argument works for
any state.)
Now consider any predicate Qx in this model. If there is no state forcing Qt for some t ∈ N,
then trivially every state forces ∃xQx→ Q0, and it follows that Hε is forced. On the other hand,
if there are i, t ∈ N such that Ai  Qt, then choose a pair i, t with minimal i. Then, by upwards
closure, ∃xQx→ Qt is forced by every state. Hence every state forces Hε.
The above model is also a countermodel for DNS∀. As ¬Pt is not forced at any world for
any t, A0  ∀x¬¬Px. However A0  ¬∀xPx, so A 6 DNS∀(P ).
Proposition 6. DP does not imply Hε in intuitionistic logic.
Proof. Consider the (intuitionistic) Kripke system with states A0  A−1  A−2  . . .  A−∞.
Let T (B) = N for every state B. Set F (A−∞) = ∅, and F (A−n) = {Pn, P (n+1), P (n+2), . . .}.
A0
A
−1
A
−2
A−∞
N P0, P1, P2, P3, . . .
N P1, P2, P3, . . .
N P2, P3, . . .
N P3, P4, . . .
N
Let t ∈ T (A−∞). Then A−(t+1) 6 Pt. However, A−(t+1)  P (t + 1), so A−(t+1)  ∃xPx.
Therefore A−(t+1) 6 ∃xPx → Pt. Thus A−∞ 6 ∃y(∃xPx → Pt), so Hε does not hold in this
model.
Now consider any predicate Qx in this model. If every state forces ∀xQx, then trivially they
also force ∃y(Qy → ∀xQx). On the other hand, if there are i, t ∈ N such that A−i 6 Qt then
choose a pair i, t with minimal i (i.e. maximal A−i). Then by upwards closure, whenever Qt is
forced, ∀xQx is also forced. Hence every state forces Qt→ ∀xQx, and so also forces DP .
In general, if a model contains an infinite sequence of states A0  A1  · · · , then a predicate
P can be constructed as in Proposition 5 in order to contradict DP. On the other hand if no
such sequence exists then every sequence of related states has a maximal element. Following
reasoning in Proposition 6 shows that DP will hold in such a model.
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Conversely, if a model contains an infinite sequence of states B0  B−1  · · · , along with
an element B−∞ which precedes every state in the sequence, then P may be constructed as in
Proposition 6, contradicting Hε.
If, on the other hand, no such states exist, then every set of related states either contains a
minimal element or has no lower bound, i.e. every set of states contains its infimum. Let A be
a state in such a model. Now consider the set S of states above A which force ∃xPx. If S = ∅,
then vacuously A  ∃tPx → Pt for every term t, so A forces Hε. Otherwise, note that A is
certainly a lower bound for S. By the above assumption, S must have a minimum element B.
Now B  ∃xPx so B  Pt for some t. By upwards closure, C  Pt for every C  B, and so
specifically for all C ∈ S. Thus whenever A  C and C  ∃xPx, we have C ∈ S, so C  Pt.
Then A  ∃xPx → Pt, and so A forces Hε. Hence Hε is forced by every state, and so holds in
this model.
We now have a characterisation for models of DP and Hε. They are the models wherein every
state has exactly one term, or otherwise,
• the model is linear, and
• all terms are known at all states (domain is constant), and
• (to model DP) every set of states has a maximal element, and/or
• (to model Hε) every set of states contains its infimum.
Where T is the set of terms (at every state):
|T | = 1 |T | ∈ N |T | ≥ |N|
Branched DP, Hε Neither Neither
Linear DP, Hε DP, Hε Indeterminate
Linear, maxΠ ex-
ists for all Π ⊂ Σ
DP, Hε DP, Hε DP
Linear, inf Π ∈ Π
for all Π ⊂ Σ
DP, Hε DP, Hε Hε
Both of the two
above
DP, Hε DP, Hε DP, Hε
If a model has graph-like connectedness, where all related pairs of states have finitely many
states between them (and so finite paths between them), then it cannot fall under the third or
fourth rows, and so cannot separate DP and Hε.
The models are evocative of the intuitions. For, recall the “last drinker in the tavern” reason
for accepting DP as true; similarly Hε can be justified by pointing to “the first person to drink”.
Corollary 7. DP and Hε are independent of each other in minimal logic with LEM (and so
certainly over decidable predicates).
Proof. Recall the Kripke systems in Propositions 5 and 6. Considering them now as minimal
Kripke systems, and forcing ⊥ at every state forces LEM everywhere, but their respective sepa-
rations still hold.
5 Separations without full models
The Constant Domain principle is
CD(Px,Q) := ∀x(Px ∨ ∃xQ)→ ∀xPx ∨ ∃xQ .
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Consider a full Kripke model in which all related worlds have the same domain. For a world A,
if A  ∀x(Px ∨ ∃xQ) then A  Pt ∨ ∃xQ for all t in the domain. If A 6 ∃xQ, then A  Pt,
and so A  ∀xPx. Therefore this is a model for CD. Hence any full Kripke countermodel for
CD must have related worlds with different domains, and so must also be a countermodel to Hε
(from the section above).
However, we cannot conclude Hε ⊃ CD, as restriction to full Kripke models does not preserve
completeness of Kripke semantics. To see that 0Hε CD(Px,Q), we require a non-full counter-
model to CD in which Hε holds. Therefore, a notion of an axiom scheme holding in a non-full
model is needed. For every formula Φ in the model, Hε(Φ) should be forced. Formulae in the
model should be at least closed with respect to the logical operations ‘→’, ‘ ∧ ’, ‘ ∨ ’, ‘∃’, and
‘∀’, and ‘⊥’ must also be a formula. The constants in the domain of the root world may also
appear in formulae, but no others.
Consider the following infinite model:
A
A0
A1
A2
{0} P0
N P0, Q0
N P0, P1, Q0, Q1
N P0, P1, P2, Q0, Q1, Q2
N P0, P1, P2, P3, Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3
We have A 6 CD(Px,Q).
Hε holds trivially for propositions. It remains to confirm that Hε holds for all predicates
which exist in this model. Predicates are definable by combining ‘Px’ and ‘Qx’, with each other
and with propositions, using the binary logical operations. Clearly, combining a predicate with
itself in this manner is trivial. The propositions available are only P0, Q0, ⊥, since
∀xPx ≡ ⊥
∀xQx ≡ ⊥
∃xPx ≡ P0
∃xQx ≡ Q0
and P0, Q0, ⊥ are closed under the binary logical operations (with respect to equivalence in this
model). First,
Px→ Qx ≡ Qx
Qx→ Px ≡ P0
Px ∨ Qx ≡ Px
Px ∧ Qx ≡ Qx
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Now, with P0,
Px→ P0 ≡ P0
P0→ Px ≡ Px
Px ∨ P0 ≡ P0
Px ∧ P0 ≡ Px
Qx→ Q0 ≡ P0
Q0→ Qx ≡ Qx
Qx ∨ Q0 ≡ Q0
Qx ∧ Q0 ≡ Qx.
With Q0,
Px→ Q0 ≡ Q0
Q0→ Px ≡ Qx
Px ∨ Q0 ≡ P0
Px ∧ Q0 ≡ Qx
Qx→ Q0 ≡ P0
Q0→ Qx ≡ Qx
Qx ∨ Q0 ≡ Q0
Qx ∧ Q0 ≡ Qx
Finally, with ⊥,
Px→ ⊥ ≡ ⊥
⊥ → Px ≡ P0
Px ∨ ⊥ ≡ Px
Px ∧ ⊥ ≡ ⊥
Qx→ ⊥ ≡ ⊥
⊥ → Qx ≡ P0
Qx ∨ ⊥ ≡ Qx
Qx ∧ ⊥ ≡ ⊥.
Thus, Px and Qx really are the only predicates in this model. A  Hε(P ) ,Hε(Q), so we
have a non-full model for Hε where CD fails.
6 From first-order to propositional schemata
Some first-order schemata are infinitary forms of propositional schemata. Viewing universal and
existential generalisation as conjunction and disjunction on propositional symbols A and B, the
drinker paradox becomes
(A→ (A ∧ B)) ∨ (B → (A ∧ B)),
and so DGP follows. A formal proof requires embedding A and B in a single predicate. For
example, over the domain of natural numbers, a predicate P such that
P (0)↔ A
10
P (Sn)↔ B
gives DP(Px) ⊢ DGP(A,B). However, such an embedding is not possible if the domain contains
a single element. It was shown above that DP holds in models with branches if the domain
contains only one term, while in [6] it is shown that DGP holds only in v-free models. Therefore
there can be no way of deriving instances of DGP from DP without an embedding using two or
more elements in the domain.
X
Y Z
{s}
{s} A {s} B
Figure 3: Kripke countermodel for DGP(A,B) where DP holds
Domain is a semantic concept. In order to derive an instance of DGP using DP, we require
syntax corresponding to the existence of more than one (distinct) term.
Definition 8. Natural deduction can be extended by adding term names 0 and 1, a unary
predicate D, and the rules
D0:
D0
D0
D1:
¬D1
¬D1
Dx:
Dx
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
D serves to make a weak distinction between the constants named by 0 and 1. 10
We call minimal (intuitionistic) logic extended by these rules two-termed minimal (intuition-
istic) logic, in which case we write ‘⊢TT ’ in place of ‘⊢’.
Semantically, an intuitionistic Kripke model for TT is one in which there are two constants
0 and 1, D0 holds at every world, and Dn is not forced for n 6= 0. For minimal Kripke models,
it is also possible instead that there is only one term, and ⊥ holds everywhere.
In general, given propositional symbols A and B, we want to define a predicate P such that
∀xPx ⊢ A ∧ B and ∃xPx ⊢ A ∨ B.
We recover
DP((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B)) ⊢EFQ,TT DGP(A,B)
Hε((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B)) ⊢EFQ,TT DGP(A,B)
DP((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)) ⊢TT WLEM(A)
Hε((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)) ⊢TT WLEM(A)
GMP((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)) ⊢TT WLEM(A)
DNS∃((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)) ⊢TT WLEM(A) .
10Bell in [3] suggests this “modest ‘decidability’ condition" in the form of a decidable equality for a single
constant a, along with a constant b 6= a.
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7 Hierarchy
The preorder from ‘⊃‘ produces a hierarchy. Arrows labelled with schemes indicate that those
schemes must be taken together with the scheme at the tail to produce the scheme at the head.
GLPO′ DP Hε
CD
GMP LEM, GLPO DGP
DNS∀, WGMP DNS∃
WLEM
T
T
E
F
Q
,
T
T
E
F
Q
,
T
T
This hierarchy is complete in the sense that no other unlabelled arrows may be added (see
below). Moreover, for arrows labelled with at least one of EFQ, TT, the remaining open questions
are if GMP,EFQ ⊃ CD and/or GMP,EFQ,TT ⊃ CD.
8 Semantics
In addition to the Kripke model analysis presented earlier, the following full models give all
possible separations of the schemes under investigation. In cases where models should have TT,
we omit labelling D0 on every world for the sake of brevity.
In [6], it is shown that DGP and WLEM hold in all v-free models, EFQ holds in a model
if and only if ⊥ is not forced anywhere, and LEM holds if only one world does not force ⊥.
Revisiting the countermodels (and previously given reasoning) for DP and Hε, we have
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A0
A1
A2
N
N
N
N
is a model for EFQ, TT, Hε, DGP, WLEM, CD, and a countermodel for DP, LEM, DNS∀, while
A0
A
−1
A
−2
A−∞
N
N
N
N
N
is a model for EFQ, TT, DP, DGP, WLEM and a countermodel for Hε, LEM.
It is trivial to check that model presented in Section 5 can be modified as follows, to model
both Hε and TT while still being a countermodel to CD.
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AA0
A1
A2
{0, 1} P0, P1
N P0, P1, Q0, Q1
N P0, P1, P2, Q0, Q1, Q2
N P0, P1, P2, P3, Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3
N P0, P1, P2, P3, P4, Q0, Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4
It is straightforward to check whether a scheme holds or fails in a given finite full model; as
only (few and) finitely many upwards closed labellings of worlds are possible, and these may be
checked exhaustively. We therefore present the remaining models without comment.
A
B C
{s, t}
{s, t} {s, t}
is a model for EFQ, TT, DNS∀, CD and a countermodel for DP, Hε, DGP, WLEM, DNS∃.
A
B C
{s, t}
{s, t} ⊥ {s, t} ⊥
is a model for GLPO′, LEM and a countermodel for DP, Hε, DGP.
A
B C
{s}
{s} {s}
is a model for EFQ, DP, Hε and a countermodel for DGP, WLEM.
A
B C
{s} ⊥
{s} ⊥ {s} ⊥
is a model for TT, DP, Hε, GLPO′ and a countermodel for DGP.
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AB C
D
{s, t}
{s, t} {s, t}
{s, t}
is a model for EFQ, TT, WLEM, GMP and a countermodel for DP, Hε, DGP.
A{s}
is a model for LEM, WLEM, DGP, GLPO′, GMP, DP, Hε, DNS∀, DNS∃, CD, EFQ and a
countermodel for TT.
A
B
{0, 1}
{0, 1, 2}
is a model for TT, EFQ, DGP, WLEM, DNS∀ and a countermodel for DNS∃, CD.
A
B
{0, 1}
{0, 1, 2} ⊥
is a model for TT, LEM and a countermodel for EFQ, GMP, CD, DNS∀, DP, Hε.
A
B
{0} ⊥
{0, 1} ⊥
is a model for TT, DGP, GMP, GLPO′ and a countermodel for EFQ, CD, Hε, DP.
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Appendix
Proposition 9. DNE ⊃ LEM
Proof.
DNE
¬¬(A ∨ ¬A)→ (A ∨ ¬A)
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
A
∨I
A ∨ ¬A
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
∨I
A ∨ ¬A
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬(A ∨ ¬A)
→E
A ∨ ¬A
Proposition 10. DNE ⊃ EFQ
Proof.
DNE
¬¬A→ A
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→E
A
→I
⊥ → A
Proposition 11. LEM,EFQ ⊃ DNE
Proof.
LEM
A ∨ ¬A A
EFQ
⊥ → A
¬¬A ¬A
→E
⊥
→E
A
∨E
A
→I
¬¬A→ A
1
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Proposition 12. Hε ⊃ IP
Proof.
HE
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
∃xPx→ Py
∃xA→ ∃xPx ∃xA
→E
∃xPx
→E
Py
→I
∃xA→ Py
∃I
∃x (∃xA→ Px)
∃E
∃x (∃xA→ Px)
→I
(∃xA→ ∃xPx)→ ∃x (∃xA→ Px)
Proposition 13. IP ⊃ Hε
Proof.
IP
(∃xPx→ ∃xPx)→ ∃x (∃xPx→ Px)
∃xPx
→I
∃xPx→ ∃xPx
→E
∃x (∃xPx→ Px)
∃xPx→ Px
∃I
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
∃E
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
Proposition 14. LEM ⊃ GLPO
Proof.
LEM
∃xPx ∨ ¬∃xPx
∃xPx
∨I
∀x¬Px ∨ ∃xPx
¬∃xPx
Px
∃I
∃xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬Px
∀I
∀x¬Px
∨I
∀x¬Px ∨ ∃xPx
∨E
∀x¬Px ∨ ∃xPx
Proposition 15. GLPO ⊃ LEM
Proof.
GLPO
∀x¬A ∨ ∃xA
∀x¬A
∀E
¬A
∨I
A ∨ ¬A
∃xA A
∃E
A
∨I
A ∨ ¬A
∨E
A ∨ ¬A
1
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Proposition 16. DNS∀ ⊃WGMP
Proof.
DNSU
∀x¬¬Px→ ¬¬∀xPx
¬∃x¬Px
¬Px
∃I
∃x¬Px
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬Px
∀I
∀x¬¬Px
→E
¬¬∀xPx ¬∀xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∃x¬Px
→I
¬∀xPx→ ¬¬∃x¬Px
Proposition 17. WGMP ⊃ DNS∀
Proof.
WGMP
¬∀xPx→ ¬¬∃x¬Px ¬∀xPx
→E
¬¬∃x¬Px
∃x¬Px
∀x¬¬Px
∀E
¬¬Px ¬Px
→E
⊥
∃E
⊥
→I
¬∃x¬Px
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∀xPx
→I
∀x¬¬Px→ ¬¬∀xPx
1
9
Proposition 18. DP(Px) is equivalent to ∃y∀x (Py → Px)
Proof. ( =⇒ )
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
Py → ∀xPx Py
→E
∀xPx
∀E
Px
→I
Py → Px
∀I
∀x (Py → Px)
∃I
∃y∀x (Py → Px)
∃E
∃y∀x (Py → Px)
∃y∀x (Py → Px)
∀x (Py → Px)
∀E
Py → Px Py
→E
Px
∀I
∀xPx
→I
Py → ∀xPx
∃I
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
∃E
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
2
0
Proposition 19. Hε(Px) is equivalent to ∃y∀x (Px→ Py)
Proof. ( =⇒ )
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
∃xPx→ Py
Px
∃I
∃xPx
→E
Py
→I
Px→ Py
∀I
∀x (Px→ Py)
∃I
∃y∀x (Px→ Py)
∃E
∃y∀x (Px→ Py)
∃y∀x (Px→ Py)
∃xPx
∀x (Px→ Py)
∀E
Px→ Py Px
→E
Py
∃E
Py
→I
∃xPx→ Py
∃I
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
∃E
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
2
1
Proposition 20. DNE,LEM,EFQ ⊃ DP
Proof. First
DNE
¬¬∃x¬Px→ ∃x¬Px
¬∀xPx
DNE
¬¬Px→ Px
¬∃x¬Px
¬Px
∃I
∃x¬Px
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬Px
→E
Px
∀I
∀xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∃x¬Px
→E
∃x¬Px
Now,
LEM
∀xPx ∨ ¬∀xPx
∀xPx
→I
Py → ∀xPx
∃I
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
¬∀xPx ⊢DNE,LEM,EFQ ∃x¬Px
EFQ
⊥ → ∀xPx
¬Px Px
→E
⊥
→E
∀xPx
→I
Px→ ∀xPx
∃I
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
∃E
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
∨E
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
Proposition 21. LEM ⊃WLEM
Proof. LEM¬A ∨ ¬¬A
2
2
Proposition 22. GMP ⊃WGMP
Proof.
¬∃x¬Px
GMP
¬∀xPx→ ∃x¬Px ¬∀xPx
→E
∃x¬Px
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∃x¬Px
→I
¬∀xPx→ ¬¬∃x¬Px
Proposition 23. DGP ⊃WLEM
Proof.
DGP
(A→ ¬A) ∨ (¬A→ A)
A→ ¬A A
→E
¬A A
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
¬A
¬A→ A ¬A
→E
A
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
∨E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Proposition 24. GLPO′ ⊃ LEM
Proof.
GLPOA
∀xA ∨ ∃x¬A
∀xA
∀E
A
∨I
A ∨ ¬A
∃x¬A ¬A
∃E
¬A
∨I
A ∨ ¬A
∨E
A ∨ ¬A
Proposition 25. GLPO′ ⊃ GMP
Proof.
GLPOA
∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
¬∀xPx ∀xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬Px
∃I
∃x¬Px ∃x¬Px
∨E
∃x¬Px
→I
¬∀xPx→ ∃x¬Px
2
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Proposition 26. DP ⊃ CD
Proof.
DP
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
∀x (Px ∨ ∃xA)
∀E
Py ∨ ∃xA
Py → ∀xPx Py
→E
∀xPx
∨I
∀xPx ∨ ∃xA
∃xA
∨I
∀xPx ∨ ∃xA
∨E
∀xPx ∨ ∃xA
∃E
∀xPx ∨ ∃xA
→I
∀x (Px ∨ ∃xA)→ (∀xPx ∨ ∃xA)
Proposition 27. DP ⊃ GMP
Proof.
DP
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
¬∀xPx
Py → ∀xPx Py
→E
∀xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬Py
∃I
∃x¬Px
∃E
∃x¬Px
→I
¬∀xPx→ ∃x¬Px
Proposition 28. Hε ⊃ DNS∃
Proof.
HE
∃y (∃xPx→ Py)
¬¬∃xPx
¬Py
∃xPx→ Py ∃xPx
→E
Py
→E
⊥
→I
¬∃xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬Py
∃I
∃x¬¬Px
∃E
∃x¬¬Px
→I
¬¬∃xPx→ ∃x¬¬Px
2
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Proposition 29. GLPO ⊃ DNS∃
Proof.
GLPO
∀x¬Px ∨ ∃xPx
¬¬∃xPx
∃xPx
∀x¬Px
∀E
¬Px Px
→E
⊥
∃E
⊥
→I
¬∃xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬Px
∃I
∃x¬¬Px
∃xPx
¬Px Px
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬Px
∃I
∃x¬¬Px
∃E
∃x¬¬Px
∨E
∃x¬¬Px
→I
¬¬∃xPx→ ∃x¬¬Px
Proposition 30. GMP ⊃ DNS∃
Proof.
GMP
¬∀x¬Px→ ∃x¬¬Px
¬¬∃xPx
∃xPx
∀x¬Px
∀E
¬Px Px
→E
⊥
∃E
⊥
→I
¬∃xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬∀x¬Px
→E
∃x¬¬Px
→I
¬¬∃xPx→ ∃x¬¬Px
Proposition 31. GLPO′ ⊃WGMP
Proof.
GLPOA
∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
¬∀xPx ∀xPx
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∃x¬Px
→I
¬∀xPx→ ¬¬∃x¬Px
¬∃x¬Px ∃x¬Px
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∃x¬Px
→I
¬∀xPx→ ¬¬∃x¬Px
∨E
¬∀xPx→ ¬¬∃x¬Px
2
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Proposition 32. DP,EFQ, TT ⊃ DGP
Proof. Where Φ = ((Dy → A) ∧ (¬Dy → B))→ ∀x ((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B)),
Lemma 1:
Φ
A
→I
Dy → A
EFQ
⊥ → B
¬Dy Dy
→E
⊥
→E
B
→I
¬Dy → B
∧I
(Dy → A) ∧ (¬Dy → B)
→E
∀x ((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B))
∀E
(D1→ A) ∧ (¬D1→ B)
¬D1→ B
DO
¬D1
→E
B
∧E
B
→I
A→ B
∨I
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
Lemma 2:
Φ
EFQ
⊥ → A
¬Dy Dy
→E
⊥
→E
A
→I
Dy → A
B
→I
¬Dy → B
∧I
(Dy → A) ∧ (¬Dy → B)
→E
∀x ((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B))
∀E
(D0→ A) ∧ (¬D0→ B)
D0→ A
DZ
D0
→E
A
∧E
A
→I
B → A
∨I
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
Now,
DP
∃yΦ
DX
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
∀E
Dy ∨ ¬Dy Lemma 1 Lemma 2
∨E
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
∃E
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
2
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Proposition 33. DP, TT ⊃WLEM
Proof. Where Φ = ((Dy → ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dy → ¬A))→ ∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)),
Lemma 1:
Φ
¬A A
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
Dy → ¬¬A
¬Dy Dy
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
→I
¬Dy → ¬A
∧I
(Dy → ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dy → ¬A)
→E
∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
∀E
(D1→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D1→ ¬A)
¬D1→ ¬A
DO
¬D1
→E
¬A A
→E
⊥
∧E
⊥
→I
¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Lemma 2:
Φ
¬Dy Dy
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
Dy → ¬¬A
¬A
→I
¬Dy → ¬A
∧I
(Dy → ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dy → ¬A)
→E
∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
∀E
(D0→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D0→ ¬A)
D0→ ¬¬A
DZ
D0
→E
¬¬A ¬A
→E
⊥
∧E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Now,
DP
∃yΦ
DX
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
∀E
Dy ∨ ¬Dy Lemma 1 Lemma 2
∨E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
∃E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
2
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Proposition 34. Hε,EFQ, TT ⊃ DGP
Proof. Where Φ = ∃x ((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B))→ ((Dy → A) ∧ (¬Dy → B)),
Lemma 1:
Φ
EFQ
⊥ → A
DO
¬D1 D1
→E
⊥
→E
A
→I
D1→ A
B
→I
¬D1→ B
∧I
(D1→ A) ∧ (¬D1→ B)
∃I
∃x ((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B))
→E
(Dy → A) ∧ (¬Dy → B)
Dy → A Dy
→E
A
∧E
A
→I
B → A
∨I
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
Lemma 2:
Φ
A
→I
D0→ A
EFQ
⊥ → B
¬D0
DZ
D0
→E
⊥
→E
B
→I
¬D0→ B
∧I
(D0→ A) ∧ (¬D0→ B)
∃I
∃x ((Dx→ A) ∧ (¬Dx→ B))
→E
(Dy → A) ∧ (¬Dy → B)
¬Dy → B ¬Dy
→E
B
∧E
B
→I
A→ B
∨I
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
Now,
HE
∃yΦ
DX
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
∀E
Dy ∨ ¬Dy Lemma 1 Lemma 2
∨E
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
∃E
(A→ B) ∨ (B → A)
2
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Proposition 35. Hε, TT ⊃WLEM
Proof. Where Φ = ∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))→ ((Dy → ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dy → ¬A)),
Lemma 1:
Φ
DO
¬D1 D1
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
D1→ ¬¬A
¬A
→I
¬D1→ ¬A
∧I
(D1→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D1→ ¬A)
∃I
∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
(Dy → ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dy → ¬A)
Dy → ¬¬A Dy
→E
¬¬A ¬A
→E
⊥
∧E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Lemma 2:
Φ
¬A A
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
D0→ ¬¬A
¬D0
DZ
D0
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
→I
¬D0→ ¬A
∧I
(D0→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D0→ ¬A)
∃I
∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
(Dy → ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dy → ¬A)
¬Dy → ¬A ¬Dy
→E
¬A A
→E
⊥
∧E
⊥
→I
¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Now,
HE
∃yΦ
DX
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
∀E
Dy ∨ ¬Dy Lemma 1 Lemma 2
∨E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
∃E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
2
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Proposition 36. GMP, TT ⊃WLEM
Proof. Lemma 1:
∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
∀E
(D0→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D0→ ¬A)
D0→ ¬¬A
DZ
D0
→E
¬¬A
∧E
¬¬A
∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
∀E
(D1→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D1→ ¬A)
¬D1→ ¬A
DO
¬D1
→E
¬A
∧E
¬A
→E
⊥
→I
¬∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
Lemma 2:
¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
¬A A
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
Dx→ ¬¬A
¬Dx Dx
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
→I
¬Dx→ ¬A
∧I
(Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Lemma 3:
¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
¬Dx Dx
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
Dx→ ¬¬A
¬A
→I
¬Dx→ ¬A
∧I
(Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Now, where Φ = ¬∀x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))→ ∃x¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)),
GMP
Φ Lemma 1
→E
∃x¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
DX
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
∀E
Dx ∨ ¬Dx Lemma 2 Lemma 3
∨E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
∃E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
3
0
Proposition 37. DP,LEM ⊃ GLPO′
Proof.
DP
∃y (Py → ∀xPx)
LEM
Py ∨ ¬Py
Py → ∀xPx Py
→E
∀xPx
∨I
∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
¬Py
∃I
∃x¬Px
∨I
∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
∨E
∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
∃E
∀xPx ∨ ∃x¬Px
Proposition 38. DNS∃, TT ⊃WLEM
Proof. Lemma 1:
¬∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
(D0→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D0→ ¬A)
∃I
∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
⊥
→I
¬((D0→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D0→ ¬A))
¬¬A
→I
D0→ ¬¬A
¬D0
DZ
D0
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
→I
¬D0→ ¬A
∧I
(D0→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D0→ ¬A)
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬¬A
Lemma 2:
¬∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
(D1→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D1→ ¬A)
∃I
∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
⊥
→I
¬((D1→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D1→ ¬A))
DO
¬D1 D1
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
→I
D1→ ¬¬A
¬A
→I
¬D1→ ¬A
∧I
(D1→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬D1→ ¬A)
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
Lemma 3:
¬¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
(Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)
Dx→ ¬¬A Dx
→E
¬¬A ¬A
→E
⊥
∧E
⊥
→I
¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
3
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Lemma 4:
¬¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
(Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)
¬A A
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬A
¬Dx→ ¬A ¬Dx
→E
¬A
→E
⊥
∧E
⊥
→I
¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
⊥
→I
¬A
∨I
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
Where Φ := ¬¬∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))→ ∃x¬¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A)),
DNSE
Φ
Lemma 1 Lemma 2
→E
⊥
→I
¬¬∃x ((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
→E
∃x¬¬((Dx→ ¬¬A) ∧ (¬Dx→ ¬A))
DX
∀x (Dx ∨ ¬Dx)
∀E
Dx ∨ ¬Dx Lemma 3 Lemma 4
∨E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A
∃E
¬A ∨ ¬¬A3
2
